APNIC reverse-DNS service outage report: May 2018

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What happened:

• We lost DNSSEC for 121.in-addr.arpa

Secure64 DNSSEC signer on nx-signer has an unknown bug that caused 121.in-addr.arpa to be signed by previous ZSK, that was no longer present in the DNSKEY resource record.

This caused DNSSEC validation failure for 121.in-addr.arpa when the zone was republished.

- Timeline
 - 05-05-2018 03:00 nx-signer completed ZSK rollover for all zones
 - including 121.in-addr.arpa zone.
 - 08-05-2018 10:30 GGM raised NOC ticket about DNSSEC validation issue.
 - 08-05-2018 11:40 Incremented zone serial of 121.in-addr.arpa on master.
 - 08-05-2018 11:56 121.in-addr.arpa validation test from dnsviz.net returns OK.
- Root Cause/s
 - Unknown bug in the signer that caused 121.in-addr.arpa to be signed by ZSK that was not in the DNSKEY resource record.





What didn't happen

- We didn't self-detect
 - This was found due to community concern in the JP operations community
 - 3 day 9 hour outage does not meet acceptable service levels
- Why didn't we detect?
 - APNIC monitoring systems were in transition to puppet v5 and had been accidentally left disabled for Secure64 signing checks
- Informal ticketing
 - GGM raised internal NOC ticket from private request in JP community
 - We need better formal reporting lines for these problems
 - This is an NRO wide issue: we need to discuss inter-RIR and inter-NIR NOC 24/7





Remediation

- Corrective and Preventative Measures
 - Apply recent secure64 software update on nx-signer and ia-signer
 - Run multiple DNSSEC monitoring to capture different failure types.
 - Validation using Bind dig & LDNS drill tool has been installed on 6 DNS recursive servers.
 - TXT resource record TTL for all signed zones were reduced to 10min for validation to get non cache data every 15-minute run.
 - Add monitoring, to compare DNSKEY used for signing against DS record in the parent zone.
 - Runbook for operations duty cycle revised to emphasize checks
- NRO Engineering Coordination Group (ECG) is discussing updated contact information and NOC processes.



Community reporting

- We publish service outages at
 - <u>https://www.apnic.net/about-apnic/service-updates/</u>
- This outage report available as
 - <u>https://www.apnic.net/about-apnic/service-updates/service-announcement-8-may-2018/</u>
- Subsequent DNS service issues, remediation work also noted here
 - <u>https://www.apnic.net/about-apnic/service-updates/service-announcement-04-june-2018/</u>
 - <u>https://www.apnic.net/about-apnic/service-updates/service-announcement-07-june-2018/</u>
 - <u>https://www.apnic.net/about-apnic/service-updates/service-announcement-9-august-2018/</u>
 - https://www.apnic.net/about-apnic/service-updates/service-announcement-28-august-2018/



